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In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
- vs. -
DONALD HANSEN 
Defendant-Appellant 
Case No. 
10999 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant, Donald Hansen, appeals from a 
conviction on jury trial for the crime of assault with 
a deadly weapon with intent to commit robbery. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The appellant was convicted on jury trial for 
the charged offense of assault with a deadly weapon 
with intent to commit robbery. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the conviction in 
the lower court, or, in the alternative, a new trial. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent agrees with the statement of facts 
as contained in the brief of appellant. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
AN AUTOMATIC WEAPON WHICH CAN BE 
LOADED WITHIN A MATTER OF MOMENTS 
IS A DEADLY WEAPON WHEN THE OFFENSE 
INVOLVED IS ASSAULT WITH A DEADLY 
WEAPON WITH INTENT TO COMMIT ROB-
BERY. 
The appellant asserts as a basis for the relief 
he seeks on appeal the refusal of the trial court to 
instruct the jury as requested by appellant. The re-
quested instruction which was refused provides: 
You are instructed that before you can find the 
defendant guilty of the grime of Assault with a 
Deadly Weapon with the Intent to Commit Rob-
bery, you must find beyond a reasonable [doubt] 
that defendant did in fact use a deadly weapon. 
You are urther instructed that an unloaded gun is 
not a deadly weapon. The State must prove beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the gun held by Don Han-
sen in this case was loaded at the time. If it is reas-
onable to believe that the gun was not loaded, you 
should acquit the defendant." (Emphasis Added.) 
The instruction in question demands an acquittal 
if it is found by the jury that the defendant's gun 
was unloaded, the conclusion being that an unload· 
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ed gun is not a "deadly weapon" within the mean-
ing of Utah Code Ann. § 76-51-3 (1953). 
That an unloaded gun may constitute a "deadly 
weapon" has been recognized by the courts. Peo-
ple v. White, 115 Cal. App.2d 828, 253 P.2d 108 (1953). 
See 79 ALR2d 1412, 1417. Generally this recognition 
is based on the fact that an unloaded gun may be 
used_as a bludgeon and may, therefore, be a "dead-
ly" weapon, depending on the circumstances of 
size, weight; and manner of use. See I Wharton, 
Criminal Law and Procedure § 361 (12th ed. 1957). 
An unloaded gun need not actually be used as 
a bludgeon in order for it to be classified as a "dead-
ly" weapon. It is sufficientif the gun may be so used, 
as was stated in People v. White, 116 Cal. App.2d 
828, 253 P.2d 108 (1953): 
If a person is armed with a pistol at the time he 
perpetrates a crimes, this evidence is sufficient to 
sustain a finding by the trier of fact that he was 
armed with a dangerous or deadly weapon, even 
though it was not loaded. 
Thus, an instruction that absolutely precludes 
a finding that an unloaded gun is a deadly weapon 
is improper and the trial court did not err in refusing 
to give the instruction in question. 
Assuming, which the respondent does not, that 
the actual or attempted use of the gun as a bludgeon 
is not involved, and that the gun is deadly only with 
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respect to its inherent capacity as a firearm to inflict 
death or serious bodily harm, it is submitted by re-
spondent that the trial court did not err in instructin'J 
the jury with respect to that which constitutes a 
"deadly weapon" as that term is used in Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-51-3 (1953). The court's instruction number 
thirteen provided: 
... A 'deadly weapon' as that term is used in these 
instructions, means a weapon which in the partic-
ular manner used is then and there capable of pro-
ducing death or great bodily harm. A loaded gun 
capable of being fired, or a gun capable of being 
fired and which can then and there be immediately 
loaded within a matter of moments, is a deadly 
weapon. 
The appellant attacks that portion of the instruc-
tion which implicitly dictates that an unloaded gun , 
is a deadly weapon if it can be "immediately loaded 
within a matter of moments." The attack is based on 
those cases which have held that a gun is a deadly 
weapon even if certain mechanical movements must 
be made before the gun is capable of being fired, 
if the movements and the possible ultimate dis-
charge of the cartridge can be effected "instantly." 
People v. Pearson. 150 Cal. App.2d 811, 311 P.2d 142 
(1957); People v. Simpson. 134 Cal. App. 646, 25 P.2d 
1008 (1933). Cf. People v. Young, 105 Cal. App.2d 
612, 233 P.2d 155 (1951). Apparently it is the appel· 
lant's contention that an "immediate" loading "with-
in a matter of moments" is something less than the 
law demands as a basis for a determination that a 
"deadly weapon" was used since the capability d 
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producing a discharge of the cartridge would not be 
reached "instantly." 
Respondent cannot subscribe to such an arti-
ficial distinction in cases of this nature. Historically, 
in the days when the muzzle loader was the ultimate 
weapon, it might have been of logical significance 
to determine if all steps immediately preceding the 
actual pulling of the trigger had been accomplished. 
This might have been important in that a failure to 
accomplish such steps prior to confrontation would 
have afforded the indiviidual at whom the gun was 
directed the opportunity of retreating or disarming 
the assailant. 
The modern automatic weapon presents a con-
text much different than that described above inso-
far as the gun being "unloaded" might be relevant. 
With a clip containing ammunition readily avail-
able, all things necessary for bringing the weapon 
to the brink of firing can be completed in such a 
short span of time that the opportunity for safety is 
not presented to the victim as might be the case 
with other less sophisticated weapons. 
A distinction drawn between an "instant" ca-
pacity to fire and one which is "immediate" and 
"within a matter of moments" is at best slight. The 
description of the mechanical process which would 
have been necessary to discharge a cartridge (ap-
pellant's brief P. 8), assuming the clip was not in the 
gun, is sophistic in its portrayal of the process as 
extended and time-consuming. A use of automatic 
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weapons .. particularly those of the type used by ap-
pellant, clearly demonstrates that the entire opera-
tion is of such brief duration that it is inappropriate 
to argue that a "deadly weapon" was not used. 
In determining whether a deadly weapon has , 
been used in the perpetration of a crime, attention 
should be directed to the totality of the circumstances 
rather than to arbitrary standards which have be-
come outmoded. If the potential effective use of the 
weapon is the same whether the clip is in the gun , 
or can be inserted quickly, then a classification cf 
the weapon as "deadly" should logically follow in 
both cases. That the clip containing live rounds was 
readily at hand is not disputed in this case. 
Finally, it must be noted that generally those 
cases which have held that an unloaded gun is not 
a deadly weapon have so held where the offense 
involved was "assault with a deadly weapon." 
It is submitted by respondent that a distinction 
must be drawn between that which consitutes a 
"deadly weapon" as anticipated by the offense of 
mere "assault with a deadly weapon," see Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-7-6 (1953) and that which can be 
considered as a "deadly weapon" within the offense 
of "assault with a deadly weapon with intent to com-
mit robbery," see Utah Code Ann. § 76-51-3 (1953). 
It is clear that what may not be a "deadly 
weapon" in one context may be a "deadly weapon'' 
in another. Thus, while the general rule appears to 
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be that an unloaded gun, when considered as a 
firearm, is not a deadly weapon when the charge is 
"assault with a deadly weapon," an unloaded gun 
may be a deadly weapon when some other criminal 
offense is involved. Thus, an unloaded gun may be 
a "deadly weapon" within those statutes denounc-
ing the carrying and concealing of such weapons. 
People v. Ekberg, 94 Cal. App.2d 613, 211 P.2d 316 
(1949). Similarly, being unloaded does not take a 
gun out of the "deadly weapon" class under those 
statutes proscribing the exhibition of such weapons. 
Cittadino v. State, 199 Miss. 235, 24 So2d 93 (1945). 
And an unloaded gun is a "deadly weapon" within 
the meaning of statutes establishing first degree 
robbery, i.e., robbery perpetrated while one is 
armed with a deadly weapon. E.g., People v. Na-
varro, 212 Cal. App.2d 299, 27 Cal. Rptr. 716 (1963). 
See generally 79 ALR2d 1412 (1961). 
An examination of the various forms of criminal 
assault which involve the use of a deadly weapon 
reveals that, where a firearm is the weapon in ques-
tion, the state of being unloaded is relevant only 
with respect to certain assaults. 
Thus, where the offense of "assault with a dead-
ly weapon" is under consideration, the question of 
whether the gun is loaded or not becomes highly 
relevant. The gravamen of the offense is the use of 
a dangerous or "deadly" weapon "with intent to 
hurt." See 1 Wharton, Criminal Law and Procedure 
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§ 361 (12th ed. 1957); 92 A.L.R.2d 635 (1963) and cases 
cited. If the gun is unloaded the offense is incom-
plete since, depending on the jurisdiction, either or 
both the intent to harm and the requisite present 
ability to inflict the harm would be lacking. See 79 
A.L.R.2d 1412, 1418, 1421 (1961). 
Similarly, where the offense involved is "assault 
with the intent to commit murder" or "to do bodily 
harm" by the use of a deadly weapon, the use of an 
unloaded gun negates criminal responsibility, the 
reason being that the necessary intent is nonexistent 
or that the accused is incapable of effecting the de-
sired result. 
However, contrary to those assaults where the 
intent to harm or kill and the present ability to do so 
are involved, the unloaded status of the gun is ir-
relevant where the offense charged is "assault with 
a deadly weapon with intent to commit robbery." 
The intent is not to actually hurt or kill the subject 
of the assault. Rather the intent is to create such fear 
and apprehension in the victim that he will give up ' 
his property without physical resistance. The empha-
sis is transferred from the status of the gun as it 
affects the intent and the present ability to inflict 
harm to the creation of the apprehension in the vic-
tim. And, of course, the apprehension may be cre-
ated irrespective of the fact that the weapon is un-
loaded. 
This distinction based on the nature of the spe-
cific type of assault involved was recognized and 
-:g 
ably discussed in McNamara v. People, 24 Colo. 61, 
48 Pac. 541 (1897) wherein the court stated: 
This diversity of opinion [as to the effect of a gun 
being unloaded] has arisen in cases wherein the 
alleged assault was made towards the perpetration 
of an offense that could not possibly be consum-
.. mated unless the firearm was loaded, -such as 
murder or bodily injury. And we find no case where-
in the facts essential to support the allegation of 
an assault with intent to commit robbery or a like 
crime is discussed or determined; this being an 
offense that may be committed by intimidation, as 
well as by actual force. The intimidation of a per-
son may be just as effectually accomplished by an 
apparent, as well as an actual, ability to inflict the 
menaced injury; and therefore the reason of the 
rule adopted in the cases holding proof of actual 
ability necessary is not applicable to a case of this 
character. 
The unloaded status of the gun not being de-
±erminative in cases of this type, the trial court did 
not err in denying the defendant's requested instruc-
tion or in instructing the jury as it did. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN RE-
FUSING TO ALLOW TESTIMONY· CONCERN-· 
ING AN ACCIDENT ALLEGEDLY CAUSING 
BRAIN DAMAGE. TO THE APPELLANT. 
Council for the appellant attempted ot elicit from 
the appellant testimony regarding an accident in 
which the appellant was involved. Mr> Ross ask.eel: 
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"Now, Mr. Hansen, back in 1957 did you have an 
accident"? An objection to the question was sus-
tained by the trial court. (R. 138). Counsel for the -ap-
pellant later attempted to explain the relevance of 
the question. Apparently the appellant fell down a 
flight of stairs in 1957. He allegedly suffered brain , 
damage, and a blood clot on the brain resulted 
which necessitated an operation for removal of the 
blood clot. As a result of the operation, appellant's 
tolerance for alcoholic beverages allegedly was re-
duced causing him to black out and engage in ir-
rational behavior upon the consumption of lesser 
amounts of alcoholic beverages. It is not disputed 
that appellant had been drinking the evening on 
which the acts in question occurred. The evidence 
of the prior accident is purported to further substan-
tiate the appellant's assertion that he "blacked out" 
for the period in question and, that he, therefore, 
had no specific intent to commit the crime for which 
he was convicted. 
The nearly universal rule that voluntary intoxi- l 
cation is no defense to a crime has been codified in 
this state. Utah Code Annotated § 76-1-22 (1953). An 
exception to this rule is the relief from certain crim-
inal responsibility which is afforded when the Of-
fense requires what has been described as a "spe-
cific intent" and the intoxication negates such an 
intent. 
In attempting to prove intoxication and thus a 
negation of the requisite specific intent, evidence 
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introduced must be such that it relates to the state 
of intoxication of the appellant. Was the proffered 
evidence in this case such that it reasonably related 
to the question of whether the appellant was intoxi-
cated at the time of the commission of the offense? 
It was assumed by appellant that the operation 
on his brain directly affected his capacity to con-
sume alcohoiic beverages without suffering certain 
adverse affects such as black outs or loss of mem-
ory. There is nothing to indicate that the type of op-
eration sustained by the appellant is in any way re-
la,ted to a tolerance for alcoholic beverages other 
than expressions by those not qualified to speak on 
such technical matters. Without such a showing, the 
evidence is irrelevant and was properly excluded, 
for it could not then be inferred from the fact of the 
operation that the defendant was intoxicated on the 
night in question. See generally 1 Wharton, Criminal 
Evidence § 148 (1955). 
The operation occurred in 1957 and was con-
sidered to be too remote in point of time from the 
acts in question, Remoteness is a matter left to the 
sound discretion of the trial judge. Evans v. Gais· 
ford. 122 Utah 156, 247 P.2d 431 (1952). 
Assuming the proffered evidence was admiss-
able, it was not prejudicial error to exclude such evi-
dence. The record is replete with testimony con-
cerning the possible intoxication of the appellant. 
If the jury had been inclined to believe that a spe-
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cific intent to commit robbery was nonexistent, there 
was sufficient evidence on which it could have based 
such a belief. 
CONCLUSION 
An automatic firearm which can be loaded with-
in a matter of moments is a "deadly weapon" when 
the offense charged is assault with a deadly weapon 
with intent to commit robbery. 
The exclusion of the evidence of a prior acci-
dent is not grounds for reversal. The evidence is too 
remote in point of time and does not relate reason-
ably to the question of intoxication. The exclusion 
was not prejudicial if the evidence was admissable. 
Respondent urges, therefore, that the conviction 
of the appellant be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
ROBERT J. STANSFIELD 
Assistant Attorney General 
State of Utah 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Respondent 
